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A password composition policy restricts the space of allowable passwords to eliminate weak passwords that
are vulnerable to statistical guessing attacks. Usability studies have demonstrated that existing password
composition policies can sometimes result in weaker password distributions; hence a more principled ap-
proach is needed. We introduce the first theoretical model for optimizing password composition policies. We
study the computational and sample complexity of this problem under different assumptions on the struc-
ture of policies and on users’ preferences over passwords. Our main positive result is an algorithm that
– with high probability — constructs almost optimal policies (which are specified as a union of subsets of
allowed passwords), and requires only a small number of samples of users’ preferred passwords. We comple-
ment our theoretical results with simulations using a real-world dataset of 32 million passwords.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Imagine a web surfer, an online shopper, or a reviewer in a prominent CS and Eco-
nomics conference1 who logs on for the first time to a server; so that she can sign up
for some service, place a shopping order, or view a list of assigned papers. Such a user
registers on the server by choosing a username and picking a password. Naturally, our
user’s first attempt at picking a password is her favorite combination ‘123456’, which
the server declines. She then has to pick a password that follows certain guidelines:
of suitable length, involving lower- and upper-case letters, with numbers or special
characters, etc. Such password composition policies defend against the “first line” of
attack – guessing attacks by uninformed attackers (attackers with no previous knowl-
edge of the user whose account they are trying to break into).
Password composition policies are a necessity because — without them — user-
selected passwords are predictable. Indeed, many unrestricted users would select sim-
ple passwords like ‘123456’, ‘password’ and ‘letmein’ [Doel 2012]. Furthermore, this
issue is of great importance to today’s economy. Passwords are commonly used in elec-
tronic commerce to protect financial assets. In fact, the passwords themselves have
1All three might be the same person.
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financial value. Symantec reported that compromised passwords are sold for between
$4 and $30 on the black market [Fossi et al. 2008], and a 2004 Gartner case study
[Witty et al. 2004] estimated that it cost a large firm over $17 per password-reset
call. Nevertheless, existing password composition policies are typically not principled,
and do not necessarily result in less common passwords. For example, studies show
that users respond to restrictions in predictable ways [Komanduri et al. 2011], or pick
weaker passwords due to user-fatigue [Clair et al. 2006; Kruger et al. 2008].
In this paper, we initiate the algorithmic study of password composition policies.
Such policies restrict the space of passwords to a subset of allowed passwords, and force
each user to pick a password in this subset. Thus, n users induce a distribution over
passwords where for a password w, Pr[w] = 1n |{i : i picks w}|. By declaring different
subsets of allowed passwords, different password composition policies induce different
distributions. Our work formalizes and addresses the algorithmic problem a server
administrator faces when designing a password composition policy; we ask:
In what settings can the information about the users’ preferences over pass-
words allow us to design a password composition policy that is guaranteed
to induce a password distribution as close to uniform as possible?
We wish to stress at this point that we do not take a cryptographic approach to
the problem: we do not design a protocol aimed at amplifying a password’s strength,
nor do we rely on standard cryptographic assumptions or techniques in designing our
password composition policies. Single-factor authentication does not defend against
an attacker who learns about the most probable password from an external source.
Furthermore, because password systems often allow users multiple attempts in enter-
ing their password, an attacker can make a small number of guesses with impunity.
Therefore, we instead focus on the design and analysis of algorithms for optimizing
the password composition policy’s induced distribution over passwords, and in our the-
oretical results compare the performance of our algorithm to the optimal policy among
exponentially many potential policies in the worst case.
1.1. Our Model
We study the algorithmic problem of optimizing password composition policies along
multiple dimensions: the goal, the user model, and the policy structure.
Goal. We focus on designing a policy that maximizes the minimum-entropy of the re-
sulting password distribution. Specifically, we assume the server deals with n users,
each picking a password from some space of passwords P that respects the server’s
password composition policy. These n passwords form a distribution over the domain
of all allowed passwords and our goal is to minimize the probability of the most
likely password. This is a natural goal (see Section 7), as opposed to maximizing the
Shannon-entropy of the distribution, which for example is still high even if half the
people choose the same password and the other half choose a password uniformly at
random from P . From a security standpoint, the minimum entropy represents the frac-
tion of accounts that could be compromised in one guess. For example, an adversary
would be able to crack 0.9% of RockYou passwords [Imperva 2010] with only one guess.
Alternatively, should the attacker attempt to break into only one account, the mini-
mum entropy represents the likelihood that the account is compromised on the first
guess. We also consider a slightly stronger goal of minimizing the fraction of accounts
that could be compromised using k guesses, that is, the overall probability of the k
most likely passwords [Boztas 1999].
User model. We consider two models for how users select passwords when presented
with a password composition policy.
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In the ranking model, each user has an implicit ranking over passwords, from the
most preferred to the least preferred. Given a password policy, each user selects the
highest-ranking password among those allowed by the policy. There is a distribution
over the space of rankings that determines the fraction of users with each possible
ranking. Note that for any password composition policy, such a distribution over rank-
ings induces a distribution over the most preferred allowed passwords.
In the normalizationmodel, there is a distribution D over the space of all passwords.
This distribution tells us the likelihood that an unrestricted user would select a given
password. Given a password composition policy, D induces a new distribution over the
allowed passwords (which can be obtained by normalizing the probabilities under D of
the allowed passwords). When we ban a password the fraction of users that prefer each
allowed password grows; the natural interpretation is that users who preferred an
allowed password still use that password, but users who preferred a banned password
are redistributed among the allowed passwords according to the induced distribution.
As we show, the normalization model is strictly more restrictive than the ranking
model: any distribution in the normalization model can be simulated in the ranking
model, but there exist hardness results for the ranking model that do not hold for the
normalization model.
Policy structure. We consider the best policy that is restricted to manipulation of a
given set of rules — each rule is simply a predefined subset of potential passwords.
These rules are given to us as part of the problem (see Section 7 for a discussion of this
point). If we interpret a rule as a subset of banned passwords (e.g., passwords shorter
than seven characters), its complement (e.g., passwords of at least seven characters)
can be interpreted as a subset of allowed passwords. As such, when we take the union
of rules we get either a set of banned passwords (negative rules) or allowed passwords
(positive rules); this is our password composition policy. While the distinction between
the two cases may at first seem a mere technicality, it is in fact quite significant due to
the following observation. If we ban the union of rules then in order to ban a password
that was picked by too many users, we may ban any rule that contains this pass-
word. In contrast, if we allow a union of rules then in order to ban this password we
must not allow any rule that contains it. In other words, when our goal is to discard
a password in the negative rules setting, we have multiple ways to do so. When our
goal is to discard a password in the positive rules setting, we have only one way to
do so — excluding all rules that allow this password. As we shall see, this seemingly
small difference leads to a clear separation between the two scenarios in terms of the
complexity of designing optimal policies.
We pay special attention to the case where each password has its own singleton rule.
In this setting, a policy can be interpreted as a “blacklist” of banned passwords that do
not necessarily share common characteristics. Note that when each password has its
own singleton rule, it does not matter whether these rules are positive or negative.
1.2. Our Results
As we noted above, a password composition policy induces a distribution over most
preferred passwords (in both user models). Hence we can study algorithms that sample
these distributions. One can obtain such samples by asking random users to choose a
password that is constrained by a certain policy. Clearly, though, we need the number
of samples to be “small”. The size of the space of all passwords P — which we denote
by N — is typically very large (e.g., P can include all passwords that are no longer
than 32 ASCII characters). We wish to maximize entropy using a number of samples
that does not depend on N .
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Table I: Summary of Complexity Results.
Ranking Model Normalization Model
Constant k Large k Constant k Large k
Singleton rules P NP-Hard (Thm 3.4)
APX-Hard w/ UGC
(Thm 3.5)
P P (Thm 4.1)
Positive rules P (Thm 3.2 ) NP-Hard P NP-Hard (Thm 4.4)
Negative rules n1/3-approx is NP-
hard (Thm 3.6)
NP-Hard NP-Hard (Thm 4.2) NP-Hard
Before tackling this goal directly, we study the problem in a simpler setting where
the preferences of all users are given to us as input (i.e., there is no uncertainty). In
particular, here P is a part of the input and algorithms are allowed to run in time poly-
nomial in N . The computational complexity of problems in this setting informs their
study in the sampling setting: it is hopeless to design efficient sampling algorithms for
problems that are computationally hard, but computationally tractable problems may
(or may not) have efficient sampling algorithms.
Table I summarizes our complexity results. The parameter k refers to our optimiza-
tion target: minimizing the likelihood of the k most likely passwords. Some results are
direct corollaries of others — using the fact that singleton rules are a special case of
positive rules and the fact that the normalization model is a special case of the ranking
model (see Section 2). Looking at the table one immediately notices a clear separation
between negative rules and positive rules: optimization using the latter is much easier.
We therefore focus on positive rules in our attempt to design an efficient sampling
algorithm. Our main result is the best one could hope for in this setting. We design
an algorithm that works in the more general ranking model, and finds a policy whose
entropy is ǫ-close to optimal with probability 1− δ, for any given ǫ, δ > 0. The required
number of samples is polynomial in 1/ǫ, log(1/δ), and the number of positive rules m.
We can assume thatm is small, because each rule corresponds to a subset of passwords
that can be concisely described to users.
These results can be applied in a practical setting, and we show this through simu-
lated sampling experiments using natural rules and a large dataset of real passwords.
The experimental results provide evidence for the difficulty of the negative rules set-
ting: we search all combinations of rules to find the optimal policy and then attempt
to discover this policy by making decisions both randomly and with a heuristic. In the
negative rules setting, neither approach succeeded at finding the optimal policy after
hundreds of iterations at various sample sizes, and average-case performance did not
improve with sample size. In the positive rules setting, the average-case performance
of our efficient algorithm improved with sample size and, with a moderate sample size,
found policies that were either optimal or very close to optimal.
1.3. Related Work
It has been repeatedly demonstrated that users tend to select easily guessable pass-
words [Imperva 2010; Doel 2012; Bonneau 2012] and NIST recommends that organi-
zations “should also ensure that other trivial passwords cannot be set,” to thwart po-
tential attackers [Scarfone and Souppaya 2009]. Unfortunately, this task is more dif-
ficult than it might appear at first. Policies were initially developed without empirical
data to support them, since such data was not available to policy designers [Burr et al.
2006]. When hackers leaked the RockYou dataset to the Internet, both researchers
(and attackers) suddenly had access to password data, leading to many insights into
true passwords [Weir et al. 2010]. However, recent research analyzing leaked datasets
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from non-English speakers, notably Hebrew and Chinese-language websites, shows
that trivial password choices can vary between contexts, making a simple blacklist ap-
proach ineffective [Bonneau and Xu 2012]. This means that, depending on the context,
a policy based on leaked password data might provide no security guarantee, and it
has ethical issues as well.
To combat this issue, researchers have turned to a sampling approach. Bon-
neau [2012] added a system for sampling to the Yahoo! password infrastructure. This
system allows one to gain empirical data about the frequency distribution of pass-
words without revealing the passwords themselves. Such approaches provide a way of
gathering empirical data about passwords while maintaining the anonymity of users.
Our algorithms could be used in conjunction with such an infrastructure to optimize
policies.
Komanduri et al. [2011] studied the effectiveness of several basic password compo-
sition policies by using Amazon’s Mechanical Turk to conduct a large scale user study.
They found that people often respond to restrictions in predictable ways (e.g., if the
password needs to contain a capital letter users might tend to capitalize the first letter
of a password) and provide very general recommendations for password composition
policies. However, no theoretical model has been proposed for studying the password
composition problem.
Schechter et al. [2010] suggest using a popularity oracle to prevent individual pass-
words that have been used too frequently from being selected by new users. They also
proposed using the count-min sketch data structure [Cormode and Muthukrishnan
2005] to build such a popularity oracle. Malone and Maher [2012] suggest a sim-
ilar system using a Metropolis-Hastings scheme to force an approximately uni-
form distribution on passwords. Usability results on the effectiveness of dictionary
checks [Komanduri et al. 2011] suggest that such policies would be very frustrating
since the policy is hidden from users behind an oracle. In contrast, we seek to con-
struct optimal policies from combinations of rules that are visible to the user and can
be described in natural language.
This consideration of users is important to electronic commerce, even where security
is concerned. Florencio and Herley [2010] studied the economic factors that drive in-
stitutions to adopt strict password composition policies and find that they often value
the user experience over security. An e-mail provider like Yahoo! might adopt simple
composition policies because a frustrated user could easily switch to Gmail, while uni-
versities are free to adopt strict policies because users cannot switch easily.
2. A MODEL OF PASSWORD COMPOSITION POLICIES
We use P to denote the space of all possible passwords. N = |P| is used to denote the
total number of passwords. We denote the number of users by n.
A password composition policy may be specified in terms of rules. A rule is a subset
of passwords R ⊆ P (e.g., the set of all passwords with more than seven characters).
We use R1, ..., Rm to denote a list of rules that may be active or inactive. We consider
two schemes.
—Positive Rules: A password w is allowed if and only if it is allowed by some active pos-
itive rule. Formally, a password composition policy AS =
⋃
i∈S Ri is specified by a set
S ⊆ [m] = {1, ...,m} of active rules. In this setting rules should consist of sets of pass-
words which we expect to be strong (e.g., Ri might be the set of all passwords longer
than 10 characters, or the set of all passwords that use both upper and lowercase
letters, or the set of all passwords that do not include a dictionary word).
—Negative Rules:A password w is allowed if and only if it is not contained in any active
negative rule. Formally, a solution AS =
{
w ∈ P w /∈
⋃
i∈S Ri
}
is given by a subset
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S ⊆ [m] of active rules. A negative rule should consist of passwords that we expect
to be weak (e.g., Ri might be the set of all passwords without an uppercase letter, or
the set of all passwords shorter than 6 characters, or the set of all passwords that
include a dictionary word).
We also consider the special case of singleton rules, where our rules are
{w1}, . . . , {wN}. Equivalently, we are allowed to ban or allow any individual password.
We use Pr[w A] to denote the probability of a password w given composition policy
A. For w /∈ A we have Pr[w A] = 0. Given a set W ⊆ A we will also use Pr[W A] =∑
w∈W Pr[w A]. We use p (k,A) = maxW⊆A:|W |=k Pr[W A] to denote the probability of
the k most popular passwords. Intuitively, p (k,A) represents the probability that an
adversary can successfully guess a password using k attempts. To avoid cumbersome
notation we sometimes use p1 = p (1,A) to denote the probability of the most popular
password. Similarly, we use p2 (resp., pk) to denote the probability of the second (resp.,
k’th) most popular password.
We consider two user models that determine how users choose passwords under a
given password composition policy.
—The rankingmodel:A ranking is simply a permutation of P , which represents a user’s
password preferences. It can be represented using an ordered list ℓi = w1,i, ..., wN,i;
user i prefers password wj,i to wj+1,i for all j. The ranking ℓi naturally tells us which
password i will pick under any composition policy A. Specifically, i will use password
wA,i = wj,i where j = argmin{t : wt,i ∈ A}. Given a distribution D over rankings, we
have
Pr [w A] = Pr
ℓi∼D
[wA,i = w] .
—The normalization model: Let D be an initial distribution over P , and let Pr [w] =
Prx∼D [w = x]. If we select the composition policyA then the probabilities of all w ∈ A
are simply re-normalized so that
∀w ∈ P ,A ⊆ P ,Pr [w A] =
Pr [w]
Pr [A]
.
Clearly it holds for both models that the probability of an allowed password mono-
tonically increases as one bans more passwords. Formally, for all w ∈ A and B ⊆ P
such that w /∈ B we have
Pr [w A] ≤ Pr [w A\B] . (1)
Another important observation is that for our purposes the ranking model is more
general than the normalization model. Indeed, we argue that a distribution D over
passwords in the normalization model induces an equivalent distribution over rank-
ings. To generate the most highly ranked password, draw a password w1 from D. Next,
let A1 = P \ {w1}, and draw the next most preferred password w2, where w2 = w with
probability Pr[w |A1]. In the following round we ban w2 to obtain a policy A2, and so
on, until all passwords have been banned.
Given k ∈ N, our goal is to find S ⊆ [m] such that p (k,AS) ≤ p (k,AS′) for all
S′ ⊆ [m]. When k = 1 this goal is equivalent to maximizing the minimum entropy. If
p (k,AS) ≤ c·p (k,AS′)+ǫ for all S′ ⊆ [m] then we say that S is a (c, ǫ)-approximation. To
simplify notation we sometimes use c-approximation instead of (c, 0)-approximation.
3. RANKING MODEL: COMPLEXITY RESULTS
In this section we consider the complexity of finding the optimal password composition
policy in the more general ranking model when the organization is given complete in-
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formation about users’ preferences. Specifically, the organization is given the rankings
ℓ1, ..., ℓn of every user.
Our first result is for the positive rules setting. Given positive rules R1, ..., Rm we
show that p (k,AS) can be computed efficiently for constant values of k (see Theorem
3.2). In fact, for the special case k = 1 we present a very simple algorithm that suffices.
Both algorithms can be easily extended to the less general normalization model. Our
algorithms are based on three simple ideas: (1) Reduced Preference Lists — each pref-
erence list ℓi can be efficiently reduced to a short (length ≤ m) preference list ℓˆi. (2)
Guess and Check — start by guessing the ‘structure’ of the optimal solution and find
the resulting solution. (3) Iterative Elimination — find the most popular password w
and eliminate all positive rules that contain w. Our sampling algorithms are based on
the same core ideas.
Unfortunately, the picture is different in the negative rules even when k is a con-
stant. Given negative rules R1, ..., Rm we show that it is hard to even n
1/3-approximate
p (1,AS). Also, for non-constant values of k we show that it is hard to compute p (k,AS)
in the singleton rules setting, which immediately implies hardness in both the positive
rules setting and in the negative rules setting. Given a stronger complexity assumption
known as the Unique Games Conjecture [Khot 2002] it is also hard to c0-approximate
p (k,AS) in the singleton rules setting for some constant c0. However, our hardness
results do not rule out the possibility of a c-approximation for a larger constant c.
3.1. Positive Rules: Efficient Algorithm for Constant k
We first show that p (k,AS) can be computed efficiently for constant values of k in the
positive rules setting. In this section the organization is given positive rules R1, ..., Rm
as well as preference lists ℓ1, ..., ℓn. We assume that the organization can efficiently
query the preference lists (e.g., given S ⊆ [m] the organization can efficiently find
ℓi (AS) — user i’s preferred password given policy AS).
We elaborate on the key algorithmic ideas listed above. First, we can efficiently re-
duce each preference list ℓi to a list ℓˆi of at most m passwords (Claim 3.1). While the
reduced list ℓˆi is much shorter than ℓi it is still sufficient to determine user i’s pre-
ferred password given policy AS for any S ⊆ [m]. We use Pˆ to denote the reduced space
of potential passwords.
Algorithm 1 Reduce
Input:
Preference List: ℓ
Positive Rules: R1, ..., Rm
Initialize: i← 0, S0 ← [m], ℓˆ← empty ranking.
while Si 6= ∅ do
Let w be ℓ (ASi).
ℓˆ← 〈ℓˆ, w〉 ⊲ ‘Append’ the current most preferred password to ℓˆ
Si+1 ← Si \ {j w ∈ Rj} ⊲ Deactivate all rules that contain w
i← i+ 1
return ℓˆ
CLAIM 3.1. Algorithm 1 makes at most m queries to ℓ and m2 membership queries
and outputs a reduced preference list ℓˆ over at most m passwords such that for every
S ⊆ [m] it holds that ℓˆ (AS) = ℓ (AS).
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PROOF. Clearly, the algorithm’s main loop iterates at most m times because for
each i we eliminate at least one rule (e.g., |Si+1| < |Si|), so the bound on queries and
the length of ℓˆ are immediate. (Because we assume that we can query ℓ efficiently
Algorithm 1 is also efficient.) By construction we have ℓˆ(Si) = ℓ(Si) for each Si. Fix any
S ⊆ [m]. Let Si be such that S ⊆ Si yet S 6⊆ Si+1 and let wi be the most preferred word
in ℓ out of all words in
⋃
j∈Si
Rj . If it is the case that wi ∈
⋃
j∈S Rj , then wi is the most
preferred word in S too and we’re done. Otherwise, wi ∈
⋃
j∈Si\S
Rj which means that
removing the set {j ∈ Si : wi ∈ Rj} creates a set Si+1 s.t. S ⊆ Si+1, contradiction.
Second, the “guess and check” idea means that our algorithm starts by guessing
what the optimal solution looks like (e.g., what the k most popular passwords will be
in the optimal solution and what the probability of the k’th most popular password is).
There are at most (mn)
O(k)
potential solutions to brute-force try. As we show, for each
solution, it is easy to figure out which sets must be eliminated.
Algorithm 2 GuessAndCheck
Input:
Preference Lists: ℓ1, ..., ℓn
Positive Rules: R1, ..., Rm ⊆ P
Integer k
Initialize: Candidates← ∅ ⊲ Candidate Solutions
for i = 1→ n do
ℓˆi ← Reduce (ℓi, R1, ..., Rm)
Pˆ ←
⋃n
i=1 ℓˆi. ⊲ Reduced Password Space
for all (G, p) with G ⊆ Pˆ s.t. |G| = k and p ∈ {1/n, 2/n, ..., 1} do
SG,p ← [m]
while SG,p 6= ∅ and ∃w ∈
(
Pˆ \G
)
∩ ASG,p s.t Pr
[
w ASG,p
]
> p do
SG,p ← SG,p \ {j | w ∈ Rj} ⊲ Ban w because it is inconsistent with guess
if Pr
[
w ASG,p
]
≤ p for all w ∈
(
ASG,p \G
)
then
Candidates← Candidates ∪ {SG,p}
return argmin(G,p)∈Candidates p
(
k,ASG,p
)
THEOREM 3.2. Algorithm 2 runs in time polynomial in nk, mk and outputs a set of
positive rules S ⊆ [m] of positive rules such that
p (k,AS) ≤ p (k,AS′)
for every other set S′ ⊆ [m].
PROOF. It is evident that the running time of the algorithm is poly(nk,mk) since we
only have O((nm)k) potential solutions to try.
Let AS∗ denote an optimal solution and let G∗ denote the k most popular passwords
in this solution. Suppose we start with the correct guess (G = G∗ and p is the probabil-
ity of the k’th most popular password), then we claim that our algorithm must produce
the optimal solution. In particular, we maintain the invariant that AS∗ ⊆ ASG,p until
we converge to the optimal solution. Clearly, this is true initially — before we have
eliminated any passwords.
Suppose that the invariant holds and that our algorithm bans a password w ∈ P \G
by deactivating all rules in SG,p that contain w. Then by the definition of our algorithm
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we must have Pr
[
w ASG,p
]
> p. If w ∈ AS∗ then by Equation (1) we have
Pr [w AS∗ ] ≥ Pr
[
w ASG,p
]
> p ,
which contradicts the choice of G. Therefore w /∈ AS∗ , so all rules that contain it are
deactivated in AS∗ and the invariant still holds. By definition Algorithm 2 terminates
when every password w ∈ ASG,p \G has probability at most p. Because our invariant
still holds we can apply Equation (1) again to get
Pr
[
G ASG,p
]
≤ Pr [G AS∗ ] = p (k,AS∗) .
Hence, ASG,p is an optimal solution.
For the special case k = 1 the simple algorithm IterativeElimination (Algorithm 3)
suffices. The basic idea is very simple: iteratively eliminate the most popular password
w by deactivating all positive rules that contain w. We repeat this process until no
passwords remain. We claim that one of the solutions along the way was the optimal
solution.
Algorithm 3 IterativeElimination
Input:
Preference Lists: ℓ1, ..., ℓn
Positive Rules: R1, ..., Rm ⊆ P
Initialize: S0 ← [m], i← 0
while Si 6= ∅ do
w (Si)← argmax {Pr [w | ASi ] w ∈ ASi} ⊲ w (Si) is most popular allowed pwd
Si+1 ← Si \ {j w (Si) ∈ Rj} ⊲ Deactivate all rules that contain w (Si)
i← i+ 1
return Si∗ where i
∗ ← argmini p (1,ASi)
THEOREM 3.3. Algorithm 3 outputs a set of positive rules S ⊆ [m] such that
∀S′ ⊆ [m] , p (1,AS) ≤ p (1,AS′) .
PROOF. Let T denote the optimal policy. Clearly if T = [m] then our algorithm
returns S∗ = T because that is the first set we try. Otherwise, T ( [m]. Let S be the
last set our algorithm considers that has the property that T ⊆ S. Again, if T = S,
our algorithm returns S. Let w(T ) be the most popular word in AT , and because of
optimality Pr[w(T ) | AT ] ≤ Pr[w(S) | AS ].
Now, because we modify S to not contain T in the next iteration, then the most
popular word in S, w(S) has to belong to some rule Rj where j ∈ T . Therefore w(S) ∈⋃
j∈T Rj , and by the definition, the most popular word in AT satisfies Pr[w(T ) | AT ] ≥
Pr[w(S) | AT ].
But observe, because w(S) ∈
⋃
j∈T Rj , we must have that w(S) is at least as popular
in T . Indeed, if ℓ is a preference list where we disallowed P \
⋃
j∈S Rj and the most
preferred word is w(S), then as long as we disallow more words but keep allowing w(S)
the word w(S) remains at the top of the list. Therefore, Pr[w(S) | AT ] ≥ Pr[w(S) | AS ].
Combining together all inequalities we get Pr[w(T ) | AT ] = Pr[w(S) | AS ], which means
our algorithm returns S∗ = S.
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3.2. Singleton Rules: Hardness for Large k
Now we turn our attention to the problem of optimizing p (k,AS) for large values of
k. Theorem 3.4 says that unless P = NP no polynomial time algorithm can compute
p (k,AS) even with singleton rules. If we are willing to make the Unique Games Con-
jecture (UGC) [Khot 2002] then it is hard to even c0-approximate p (k,AS) for some
constant c0. These results immediately imply hardness in both the positive and neg-
ative rules setting because these settings are a generalization of the singleton rules
setting.
THEOREM 3.4. Unless P = NP there is no poly(k, n,N)-algorithm that gets as in-
put an arbitrary set of n preference-lists ℓ1, ..., ℓn over P and an integer k, and outputs
the optimal p(k,A) in the singleton rules setting.
PROOF. We prove the theorem using a reduction from the Vertex-Cover problem.
Given a graph G over g vertices and e edges and an integer t, we first define
P = {wu : u ∈ V (G)} ∪ {wu,v : (u, v) ∈ E(G)}
and observe that |P| = g + e. We also construct the following n = 2e preference-lists,
where for every edge (u, v) ∈ E(G) we have the two lists:
ℓu,v = wu, wu,v, . . .
ℓv,u = wv, wu,v, . . .
where the choice of passwords below position 2 is arbitrary, but both rankings must be
identical from position 2 onwards. Finally, we set k = g + e − t− 1.
Given a policy A ⊆ P , we denote all banned words as B = P \ A. We denote by
LB as the set of words that at least one user ranks first after banning all words in B.
Observe, L∅ = {wu : u ∈ V (G)}. Using this notation, we show this reduction indeed
proves NP -hardness.
First, suppose G has a vertex cover C of size ≤ t. Then by banning all passwords
B = {wv : v ∈ C} we now have LB = P \ B, because for every (u, v) ∈ E(G) either
wu or wv are banned, so the word wu,v appears at the top of at least one of the two
lists {ℓu,v, ℓv,u}. Therefore, the n preference-lists induce a distribution whose support
contains g + e− |B| ≥ g + e− t words, thus p(g + e− t− 1,A) < 1.
Conversely, suppose all vertex covers of G are of size at least t+1. LetA be any set of
banned words. Clearly, if |B| ≥ t+1 then the distribution induced by the n preferences-
lists has support of size at most g + e − t− 1, which means that p(g + e− t− 1,B) = 1.
Otherwise, |B| ≤ t, and we denote the set of vertices C = {v : wv ∈ B}. Observe,
since any vertex cover of G must contain ≥ t+ 1 vertices, then there has to be at least
t + 1 − |C| edges that C does not cover (since we can always complete C to a vertex
cover by adding one vertex from each uncovered edge). Therefore, there have to be at
least t+1− |C| words that do not appear at the top of any preference list. We conclude
that the distribution induced by the n preference-lists has a support of size at most
|LB| = g − |C|+ e− (t+ 1− |C|) ≤ g + e− t− 1
thus p(g + e− t− 1,A) = 1.
From the same reduction described in Theorem 3.4 we get UGC-hardness of approx-
imation. While there are sub-exponential time algorithms to solve the Unique Games
problem [Arora et al. 2010], there are no known polynomial time algorithms. Many
famous approximation hardness results are based on the Unique Games Conjecture
(e.g., 2− ǫ hardness for vertex cover [Khot and Regev 2008]). Our reduction relies on a
result in [Austrin et al. 2011], which says that vertex cover is hard to approximate up
to a (say) 1.5-factor even on bounded degree graphs. Because we start with a bounded
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degree graph we can argue that each password in our reduction appears at the top of
at most d preference-lists for some constant d. See the appendix for a formal proof.
THEOREM 3.5. There exists a constant c > 1 such that it is UGC-hard for a
poly(n,N, k)-time algorithm to c-approximate the optimal p(k,A) in the singleton rules
setting and the rankings model.
3.3. Negative Rules: Hardness of Approximation for k = 1
We next turn to negative rules, where we show that the problem is extremely difficult
even for k = 1. Though the proof appears in the appendix, it is quite interesting and
we encourage the reader to take a look.
THEOREM 3.6. Let ǫ > 0. Unless P = NP there is no polynomial time algorithm (in
N,n,m) that approximates minS⊆[m] p(1,AS) to a factor of n
1/3−ǫ in the negative rules
setting and the rankings model.
4. NORMALIZATION MODEL: COMPLEXITY RESULTS
In this section we focus on complexity results for the normalization model. Here the
structure of the input to our problem is a bit different: For each password w ∈ P we are
given the probability Pr[w] that w is selected by a random user when A = P . Note that
now we can give the distribution explicitly because it requires N numbers (whereas
a distribution over rankings requires N ! numbers). This distribution induces a distri-
bution over P for any password composition policy A by normalizing probabilities, as
explained in Section 2.
Because the normalization model is a special case of the ranking model our algo-
rithms for the ranking model can also be applied in the normalization model. The
question is whether or not the hardness results carry over.
We first consider the singleton rules setting with large k, and show that that we
can compute argminA⊆P p (k,A) in polynomial time in N (Theorem 4.1). This result
separates the normalization model from the ranking model (e.g., compare Theorems
4.1 and 3.4). However, it does not extend to the positive rules setting. In fact, we show
that optimizing p (k,AS) is NP-Hard when k is a parameter (Theorem 4.4).
With negative rules R1, ..., Rm we show that it is hard to c0-approximate
argmaxS⊆[m] p (1,AS) (Theorem 4.2). However, we cannot rule out the possibility of
an efficient c-approximation algorithm for some constant c in the normalization model
(recall that Theorem 3.6 ruled out the possibility of a c-approximation algorithm in the
ranking model for any c).
4.1. Singleton Rules: Efficient Algorithm for large k
We present SortAndOptimize — an efficient algorithm to optimize p (k,A) in the sin-
gleton rules setting for any value of k. The key intuition behind our algorithm is that
if w1 ∈ P is the most likely password then w1 will remain the most likely allowed pass-
word unless we ban it — a property that does not hold in the rankings model. A formal
proof of Theorem 4.1 can be found in the appendix.
THEOREM 4.1. For every k, Algorithm 4 computes argminA p (k,A) in the singleton
rules setting of the normalized probabilities model, in time O(N log(N)).
4.2. Negative Rules: Hardness for k = 1
We next prove an inapproximability result that is somewhat weaker than the one that
we obtained for the more general ranking model.
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Algorithm 4 SortAndOptimize
Input:
Password space P and a probability distribution over P .
Integer k.
Sort the words in P from highest to lowest probability, w1, w2, . . . , wN .
return the set Ai = {wj : j ≥ i}, where i minimizes the ratio
p(k,Ai) =
∑
i≤j≤i+k Pr[wj ]∑
j≥i Pr[wj ]
THEOREM 4.2. There exists some constant c0 > 1 such that unless NP = BPP
no polynomial time algorithm (in n,N,m) can c0-approximate minS⊆[m] p (1,AS) in the
negative rules setting and the normalization model.
We will require the following construction; the proof is given in the appendix.
LEMMA 4.3. Fix m and s such that m ≥ s. There exists a domain D of size
Θ(s2 log(m)) and a family ofm sets, F1, F2, . . . , Fm ⊆ D, such that each set in the family
contains
|D|
2s elements, and for every C ⊆ [m] of size |C| ≤ s, we have that the size of
the union
∣∣⋃
i∈C Fi
∣∣ ≥ |D|2s |C|4 . This domain can be constructed in randomized poly(s,m)
time.
That is, each set in this family contains exactly the same fraction of the domain,
and furthermore — any union of |C| ≤ s sets has the property that its cardinality is
proportional to Ω(|C|)|Fi|.
PROOF OF THEOREM 4.2. We reduce from Set-Cover — one of the classic NP -
Complete problems [Karp 1972]. We are given sets S1, ..., Sm ⊆ U , universe U =
{1, ..., g}, and an integer t ≤ m, and we are asked whether there is a set C ⊆ [m] of
size ≤ t such that U =
⋃
i∈C Si.
It is a known fact that there exist Set-Cover instances, with (g,m, t) all polynomially
dependent of each other, that are hard to approximate to a factor of c lnn [Alon et al.
2006]. That is, on this particular family of instances, it is NP -hard to distinguish
whether there exists a cover of size t or all covers have size (1− ǫ)c · t lnn.
We now describe the reduction. Given a (g,m, t)-Set Cover instance, we set s =
c · t ln g = Θ(t ln t) and construct a domain D and m sets F1, F2, . . . , Fm ⊆ D as in
Lemma 4.3. We then create the following password-banning instance. First P is the
union of D with additional disjoint g words denoted w1, ..., wg. Now, for each set Si in
the Set-Cover we add a rule Ri where Ri = {wj}j∈Si ∪ Fi. Finally, we set the words’
probabilities as follows. Fixing some arbitrarily small δ > 0, we set for every i the
probability Pr[wi] =
1−δ
g , and for every x ∈ D we set the probability Pr[x] =
δ
|D| .
Without loss of generality we can assume that |D| ≥ 100g (because, for exam-
ple, we can take 100g copies of the original D). Therefore, any policy that bans all
of {w1, w2, . . . wg} yet leaves a constant (say > 1/10) fraction of D has p1 ≤ 10/|D|,
whereas any policy that keeps even one of the words in {w1, w2, . . . , wg} has p1 ≥ 1/(2g).
Therefore, if the Set-Cover instance has a cover of size ≤ s = Θ(t ln g), then a c0-
approximation of the optimal banning-policy must find a cover for {w1, w2, . . . , wg}. We
will assume from now on that our Set-Cover instance is such that it has a cover of size
≤ s. (Indeed, if s > t log(t) then the instance is no longer NP -hard, since the greedy
algorithm must return a cover of size > t log(t) which causes us to deduce that the
optimal cover must have size > t.)
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So now, suppose our Set-Cover instance has a cover of size t. Then the respective
union of rules bans every password in {w1, w2, . . . , wg} and no more than
t
2s |D| words
ofD (we get an upper bound by multiplying the size of each set by the number of sets).
This leaves a collection of
(
1− t2s
)
|D| equally likely words, so p1 =
(
1− t2s
)−1
|D|−1 =
(1 − O(1/ log(g)))−1|D|−1 = (1 + o(1))|D|−1. In contrast, if all covers of our Set-Cover
instance have size s′ ≥ c ·t ln(g) (where, because we assume some cover has size ≤ s, we
have s′ ≤ s,) then any collection of rules that bans all words in {w1, w2, . . . , wg} must
also ban at least s
′
8s |D| words out of D. This leaves at most (1 − Ω(1))|D| words in D
and so p1 ≥ (1 − Ω(1))−1|D|−1. Denoting the latter constant as c
−1
0 , we have that any
c0− ǫ approximation of the optimal banning-policy indicates the existence of a cover of
cardinality < c · t ln(g).
4.3. Positive Rules: Hardness of Approximation for Large k
While we can show that it is possible to optimize p (k,A) in the singleton rules setting
our result does not extend to the more general positive rules setting. We are able to
show that it is NP-Hard to compute argminS⊆[m] p (k,AS). However, our reduction does
not imply approximation hardness so we cannot rule out the existence of a PTAS.
THEOREM 4.4. Unless P = NP there is no polynomial time algorithm (in N,m, n)
which outputs argminS⊆[m] p (k,AS) in the positive rules setting and the normalization
model.
The theorem’s proof is relegated to the appendix.
5. EFFICIENT SAMPLING ALGORITHMS
In a sense, our complexity results are not “realistic”, and in particular in the ranking
model our positive algorithmic results assume access to each user’s full preferences.
Moreover, some algorithms are allowed to run in polynomial time in the number of
passwords N , which can be huge. In this section we use our complexity results as
guidelines in the design of practical sampling algorithms.
Inmore detail, we are given oracle access to rulesR1, ..., Rm (e.g., we can ask whether
or not a password w ∈ Ri) and we are allowed to sample from the distribution induced
by the password composition policy AS for any S ⊆ [m]. Less formally, a sample is
equivalent to asking a random user what her favorite password is given the current
policy.
We will work in the more general ranking model, so there is essentially only one
positive result we can build on: Theorem 3.2, a polynomial time algorithm for constant
k in the positive rules setting. When adapting this algorithm to the sampling setting,
we cannot expect it to work perfectly due to the inherent uncertainty of this domain.
Instead we expect the algorithm to find an ǫ-optimal password composition policy with
probability at least 1− δ, for any given ǫ and δ. Crucially, the number of samples must
not depend on the number of passwords N , and must have a polynomial dependence
on the other parameters.
Formally, we let S∗ ⊆ [m] denote the optimal collection of positive rules to activate
(for all S ⊆ [m], p (1,AS∗) ≤ p (1,AS)). Our goal is to find a (1, ǫ)-approximation S ⊆ [m]
to p (1,AS∗), that is, S such that p (1,AS) ≤ p (1,AS∗) + ǫ, with probability 1− δ.
We first present Algorithm 5 that achieves our goal for k = 1; this algorithm is an
adaptation of Algorithm 3.
THEOREM 5.1. Algorithm 5 runs in polynomial time in m, 1/ǫ, 1/δ, requires
O
(
m log (m/δ) /ǫ2
)
samples and returns a (1, ǫ)-approximation S ⊆ {1, ...,m} of
p (1,AS∗) with probability at least 1− δ.
EC’13, June 16–20, 2013, Philadelphia, PA, Vol. X, No. X, Article X, Publication date: February 2013.
X:14 J. Blocki et al.
Algorithm 5 SampleAndEliminate
Positive Rules: R1, ..., Rm
Input: ǫ, δ
Initialize: S0 ← [m], i← 0
s← 100ǫ2 log
(
4m
ǫδ
)
while Si 6= ∅ do
Sample: Draw samples w1, ..., ws according to the distribution Pr [w ASi ]
W ← {w1, ..., ws}
sw ← |{j wj = w}| for each w ∈W .
w∗ ← argmax {sw w ∈ W} ⊲ w
∗ is the most frequently sampled password
pˆi ←
sw∗
s ⊲ pˆi is our estimation of Pr [w
∗ ASi ]
if pˆi ≤ ǫ/2 then return Si ⊲ The current solution is already sufficiently good
else
Si+1 ← Si − {j w∗ ∈ Sj} ⊲ Deactivate all rules that contain w∗
i← i+ 1
return Si∗ where i
∗ = argmax {pˆj j ≤ m} .
PROOF. Let
BADi =
{
∃w ∈ ASi
∣∣∣sw
s
− Pr [w ASi ]
∣∣∣ ≥ ǫ/2} ,
denote the event that our probability estimates are off during iteration i. Claim 5.2
bounds the probability of any bad event. The proof of Claim 5.2 can be found in the
appendix. The proof involves bucketing the passwords based on their probability, ap-
plying Chernoff Bounds to upper bound the probability of a bad estimate for our pass-
words in each bucket, and repeatedly applying union bounds.
CLAIM 5.2. Pr [∃i, BADi] ≤ δ .
For the rest of the analysis we assume that no bad event occurs. Let p∗ =
minS⊆[m] p (1,AS) and suppose that AS∗ ⊆ ASi . Clearly, this is true when i = 0. If
pˆi ≥ ǫ/2+p∗ then Pr [w∗ AS∗ ] ≥ Pr [w∗ ASi ] > p
∗ so that w∗ /∈ AS∗ . Hence,AS∗ ⊆ ASi+1
and the property is maintained for at least one more iteration. If instead pˆi < ǫ/2 + p
∗
then we have pˆi∗ ≤ pˆi ≤ p∗ + ǫ/2 so for each w ∈ ASi∗ we have Pr [w ASi∗ ] ≤ p
∗ + ǫ. We
conclude that the solution Si∗ is a (1, ǫ)-approximation.
We next explain how to extend Algorithm 2 to (1, ǫ)-approximate the optimal
p (k,AS) for any constant k.
THEOREM 5.3. There is an algorithm which runs in polynomial time (in m, 1/ǫ, δ),
takes a polynomial number of samples, and returns a (1, ǫ)-approximation S ⊆ [m] of
p (k,AS∗) with probability at least 1− δ.
PROOF SKETCH. To extend Algorithm 2 to (1, ǫ)-approximate p (k,AS) for constant
k we need one more idea. We cannot simply obtain a reduced password space Pˆ by
reducing preference lists because we can only sample from our distribution. Notice
that for any S ⊆ [m] such that i ∈ S we have Pr [w AS ] ≤ Pr
[
w A{i}
]
so to obtain a
(1, ǫ)-approximation it is sufficient to limit our attention to passwords in the following
set
Pˆ =
{
w ∃i,Pr
[
w A{i} ≥
ǫ
k
]}
.
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We can obtain a superset of Pˆ by sampling. For each positive rule Ri we draw s inde-
pendent samples from the distribution A{i} and set
Ti =
{
w
sw
s
>
ǫ
2k
}
.
Intuitively, a password w is included in Ti if and only if our estimated probabil-
ity is sufficiently large. Let T =
⋃
i Ti. For a sufficiently large sample size s =
O (poly (m, k, 1/ǫ, 1/δ)) we can apply Chernoff Bounds to argue that with probability
1− δ (1) |T | is small, i.e., O (poly (m, k, 1/ǫ, 1/δ)), and (2) T ⊃ Pˆ .
6. EXPERIMENTS
To demonstrate how our ideas could apply in a real-world scenario, we simulated
runs of Algorithm 5 by sampling with replacement from the RockYou leaked pass-
word set [Imperva 2010]. The set contains over 32 million passwords with a frequency
distribution similar to that of many other password sets [Bonneau 2012]. Note that
all results presented here are limited by the dataset and assume the normalization
model. Working in the normalization model is crucial because we cannot ask the Rock-
You users for their preferred password under a specific policy; an initial distribution
over P —which is available to us — is sufficient though, because it induces a distribu-
tion for any policy A.
We selected 21 positive rules that mirror commonly used password composition rules
that are used in practice, and looked at sample sizes s of 100, 500, 1000, 5000, and
10000. The rules included length requirements, character class requirements, combi-
nations of requirements, a dictionary check, etc. (See Appendix C for a complete listing
of the rules we selected.) For each run with a particular value of s, the algorithm re-
turns a policy AS for which we can measure p (1,AS) in the original dataset and com-
pare with the optimal p (1,AS∗), determined from running Algorithm 3 on the original
dataset. We performed 500 runs for each of the five values of s.
To gain an understanding of how policies based on negative rules perform, we took
the complement of the 21 positive rules selected above to get 21 negative rules. We then
determined the optimal negative rules policy by calculating S∗ = argminS⊆[m] p (1,AS)
via brute-force. This was required because we have no equivalent to Algorithm 3 for
negative rules. With this baseline in hand, we designed two naı¨ve algorithms, similar
in spirit to Algorithm 5. There are multiple ways to discard a password in the negative
rules setting, and one algorithm makes this decision randomly while the other bans
the smallest subset as determined from the current sample. Again, 500 runs were
performed for each s ∈ {100, 500, 1000, 10000, 50000}.
Table II: Baseline probabilities for the RockYou dataset
Baseline p (1,AS) S
Mean across negative rules policies 1.3×10−2
Mean across positive rules policies 1.0×10−2
All passwords allowed (no policy) 9.2×10−3
One positive rule (S ∈ {1, ...,m}) 6.8×10−4 8 chars, 1 upper, 1 digit
Optimal policy with positive rules 4.4×10−4 14 chars OR 2 symbols OR 8 chars, 1
upper, 1 digit
Optimal policy with negative rules 1.4×10−4 10 chars AND 2 digits AND 1 symbol
AND 1 lowercase AND not in dictio-
nary
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Table III: Performance of Sampling Algorithms with Positive Rules
Sample Size mean p (1,AS) min p (1,AS) % Optimal
100 6.8×10−3 1.2×10−3
500 9.7×10−4 4.4× 10−4 2%
1000 9.5×10−4 4.4× 10−4 10%
5000 6.0×10−4 4.4× 10−4 14%
10000 5.7×10−4 4.4× 10−4 19%
Table IV: Performance of Sampling Algortihms with Negative Rules
Random Decision Ban Smallest
Sample Size mean p (1,AS) min p (1,AS) mean p (1,AS) min p (1,AS)
100 6.8×10−3 1.2×10−3 7.2×10−3 2.3×10−3
500 4.4×10−3 6.3×10−4 9.0×10−3 2.3×10−3
1000 4.3×10−3 4.5×10−4 8.6×10−3 2.3×10−3
5000 6.3×10−3 4.5×10−4 9.2×10−3 9.2×10−3
10000 7.2×10−3 4.5×10−4 9.2×10−3 9.2×10−3
6.1. Baselines
We examined several baselines for comparison with our algorithm. Table II shows
these baselines, the probability of the most frequent password in the resulting policy,
and the optimal policy as a union or intersection of rules (for clarity, the complement
of the union of negative rules is shown as the intersection of positive rules).
As shown in Table II from the means across policies, randomly selecting a policy from
the power set of rules can be worse than having no policy. The “one rule maximum”
baseline was selected because, if decided based on sampling, onlym distributions need
be sampled. Our efficient algorithm requires the same amount of sampling, but can
find the optimal policy over S ⊆ [m] rather than S ∈ {1, ...,m}. Also of interest is the
optimal policy with negative rules, which is over 3x better than the optimal policy
with positive rules. However, as shown in the following section, the performance of
our sampling algorithms with negative rules was far worse than in the positive rules
setting.
6.2. Performance
In the positive rules setting (see Table III), the algorithm performed extremely well
even at moderate sample sizes. The average policy selected with s = 500 was almost
10x better than having no policy. At s = 1000, the optimal policy was found 10% of the
time (50 out of 500 times).
In the negative rules setting (see Table IV), however, neither algorithm found the op-
timal policy. The “Ban Smallest” heuristic, when faced with a choice between multiple
subsets that contain the most likely password, decides to ban the smallest available
subset, disrupting the space the least. This might seem like an intuitively good choice
but, in fact, it fails to find a better policy than the empty set at large sample sizes.
The randomized algorithm does better (it cannot actually do worse) but still has much
worse average case performance than using our efficient algorithm with positive rules.
7. DISCUSSION
We conclude by discussing some key points.
Where do the rules comes from? Throughout the paper we have assumed that
the rules (whether positive or negative) are given as part of the input; it is not up
to us to find these rules. Our experiments indicate that a collection of intuitive and
practical rules can already give very good results on real data. However, the question
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of deciding which rules should be added to our collection is outside the scope of this
paper. Much like the problem of feature selection, it is an interesting problem with
real-life implications, which we suspect will be very difficult in practice.
Alternate policy goals. Our goal [Boztas 1999] has been to minimize p (k,AS). In-
tuitively, p (k,AS) represents the probability that an adversary with no background
knowledge can successfully guess the password of a randomly selected user in k tries.
A small value of k optimizes security guarantees against an online guessing attack in
which the adversary is locked out after k failed attempts to login. A much larger value
of k (e.g., 232) is necessary to optimize security against an adversary who has obtained
the cryptographic hash of a password and is able to mount a brute-force dictionary
attack [Seeley 1989]. However, the optimal solutions for p (1,AS) and p
(
232,AS
)
might
be completely different. One stronger goal that we might hope to achieve is to optimize
both goals simultaneously. More formally, can we find a policy S ⊆ [m] such that for
every S′ ⊆ [m] and every k ≤ N we have p (k,AS) ≤ c · p (k,AS′) for some constant c?
Unfortunately, the answer is no. For any constant c this universal approximation goal
is impossible to satisfy in the ranking model (see Theorem B.1).
Other natural goals include α-work factor [Pliam 2000] and a refinement called α-
guesswork [Bonneau 2012] (e.g., maximize the total number of guesses needed to com-
promise α-fraction of the accounts). While α-guesswork is an useful metric to analyze
the security of 70 million Yahoo passwords [Bonneau 2012], it may not be a desirable
optimization goal for the organization because it might allow the adversary to crack
up to α− ǫ-fraction of the accounts with relatively few guesses.
Another interesting direction is to account for an adversary with basic background
information about the user (e.g., e-mail address, username, birthday). It may not
always be realistic to assume that the adversary has no background knowledge
because the adversary can often easily obtain some background knowledge about a
user by searching for publicly available information on the internet. One approach
might be to design a rule R to specify different passwords for different users (e.g., the
set of passwords that contain the username or birthday of the user).
Open Questions. While we were able to prove several hardness results about finding
the optimal password composition policy in the negative rules setting, it is possible
that these hardness results could be circumvented by making mild (hopefully realis-
tic) assumptions about the underlying password distribution or the rules R1, ..., Rm.
Are there efficient algorithms to optimize p (k,AS) in the negative rules setting given
realistic assumptions? It is also possible that mild realistic assumptions could be used
to circumvent the impossibility result of Theorem B.1, and design a universal approx-
imation algorithm.
There are also several interesting technical questions that remain open:
(1) Normalization model with negative rules: Can we efficiently c-approximate
p (1,AS∗) for any constant c? Is there a sub-exponential algorithm (in m) to com-
pute p (1,AS∗)?
(2) Ranking model with positive rules: Can we efficiently c-approximate p (k,AS∗) for
some constant c when k is a parameter?
The future. There is a real need for a principled approach to optimizing password
composition policies. We have taken a first step in this direction by providing an intu-
itive theoretical model and showing that it leads to algorithms that perform well on
real data. We can only hope that our work will spark a fundamentally new interaction
between theory and practice in passwords research.
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A. MISSING PROOFS
Reminder of Theorem 3.5. There exists a constant c > 1 such that it is UGC-hard
for a poly(n,N, k)-time algorithm to c-approximate the optimal p(k,A) in the singleton
rules setting and the rankings model.
Proof of Theorem 3.5. We begin with a construction of a bounded degree graph which
is hard approximate up to a (say) 1.5-factor. As shown in [Austrin et al. 2011], for ev-
ery constant d there exists a family of d-regular graphs for which it is UGC-hard to
determine whether there exists a vertex cover of size t, or all vertex-covers have size
at least (2−O(log log(d)/ log(d))− ǫ) t. Fixing d to be a large enough constant such that
this factor is > 1.5, we now reduce this family of instances to a password problem using
the exact same construction as in the proof of Theorem 3.4, with the exception that we
set k = g + e− (1.5− ǫ)t.
Observe, for this family of instances, e = O(g) so |P| = O(g), but also the size of the
optimal vertex-cover has to be Θ(g) (at most g and at least g/d). Furthermore, each
password appears at the top of at most d preference-lists. Therefore, by allowingA and
banning B = P \A, we not only have a distribution whose support is of size |LB|, but it
also holds that the probability of each word in LB is Ω(1/|LB|).
Therefore, if the graph has a vertex-cover C of size t, then by banning all words
B = {wu : u ∈ C} we have that the n preference-lists induce a distribution over
|LB| ≥ g + e − t. Since we set k = g + e − (1.5 − ǫ)t we have that the set of most
uncommon passwords contain at least (0.5 − ǫ)t = Ω(|LB|) words, each with Ω(1/|LB|)
probability, thus p(k,A) = 1 − Ω(1). (And, in particular, for the optimal policy A∗ we
have p(k,A∗) = 1− Ω(1).)
In contrast, applying the same argument from the proof of Theorem 3.4, we have
that if G has all vertex-covers of size > (1.5 − ǫ)t then p(k,A) = 1. The O(1)-hardness
of approximation follows. ✷
Reminder of Theorem 3.6. Let ǫ > 0. Unless P = NP there is no polynomial time
algorithm (in N,n,m) that approximates minS⊆[m] p(1,AS) to a factor of n
1/3−ǫ in the
negative rules setting and the rankings model.
Proof of Theorem 3.6. Fix ǫ > 0. Our reduction is from the Max-Independent-Set prob-
lem, which is known to be hard to approximate up to a factor of n1−ǫ [Ha˚stad 1996].
We are given a graph G with g vertices and e edges, and we must determine whether
the size of G’s largest independent set is g1−ǫ or gǫ.
Given a Max-Independent-Set instance, we denote K = gǫ and create the following
password policy instance, which is composed out of the following set of possible words:
P = {A1, ..., AK} ∪ {B1, ..., Bg}
∪

 ⋃
{u,v}∈E(G)
(
{Cvu,1, ..., C
v
u,g} ∪ {C
u
v,1, ..., C
u
v,g}
)
∪

 ⋃
v∈V (G),1≤i<j≤K
({Dv,i,j,1, ..., Dv,i,j,g} ∪ {Dv,j,i,1, ..., Dv,j,i,g})

 ∪ {X}
We now describe the n = g + ge+ g2
(
K
2
)
≤ g3 + g2+2ǫ users’ preference-lists. We start
with the g rankings specified in Table V(a). We continue with gemore rankings, where
for each edge (u, v) ∈ E(G) we add g more rankings, as detailed in Table V(b). Lastly,
we add g2
(
K
2
)
more rankings, where for each triple (v, i, j) where v is a vertex of G and
i 6= j ∈ [K] we add g rankings, as detailed in Table V(c). (Observe, the tables detail the
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Table V: Rankings used in the proof of Theorem 3.6.
(a) First type.
ℓ1 . . . ℓg
A1 . . . A1
A2 . . . A2
. . .
AK . . . AK
B1 . . . Bg
. . .
(b) Second type.
ℓu,v,1 . . . ℓu,v,g
Cvu,1 . . . C
v
u,g
Cuv,1 . . . C
u
v,g
X . . . X
. . .
(c) Third type.
ℓv,i,j,1 . . . ℓv,i,j,g
Dv,i,j,1 . . . Dv,i,j,g
Dv,j,i,1 . . . Dv,j,i,g
X . . . X
. . .
first few words in each list, then end with “. . .” mark, which indicates that from that
point on the remaining words may appear in any order.)
Finally, we detail our rules. For every i ∈ [K] and u ∈ V (G) we have a rule which
roughly corresponds to deciding that u is a member of the independent set:
Ru,i = {Ai} ∪
⋃
{v: (u,v)∈E(G)}
{Cvu,1, C
v
u,2, . . . , C
v
u,g} ∪
⋃
j∈[K],j 6=i
{Du,i,j,1, . . . , Du,i,j,g} .
Our analysis now follows from a series of observations.
Observation 1: If we do not ban all of the passwordsA1, ..., AK then p1 ≥ g/n. Therefore,
for every i, we must choose at least one of the rules {Ru,i} to activate, or else we have
that p1 ≥ g/n
Observation 2: If we ban Cvu,1, . . . , C
v
u,g and C
u
v,1, . . . , C
u
v,g then we must have p1 ≥ g/n.
Therefore, for any i 6= j it must not be the case that we ban Ru,i and Rv,j where
(u, v) ∈ E(G), or else we have that p1 ≥ g/n.
Observation 3: If we ban Dv,i,j,1, . . . , Dv,i,j,g, and Dv,j,i,1, . . . , Dv,j,i,g then p1 ≥ g/n.
Therefore, for any i 6= j it must not be the case that we ban Ru,i and Ru,j , or else
we have that p1 ≥ g/n.
These observations lead us to the following conclusion. If G contains an independent
set v1, ..., vK of size K, then activating the rules {Rv1,1, Rv2,2, . . . , RvK ,K} leads to a
setting where each truncated ranking begins with a unique word, so p1 = 1/n. In
contrast, if G does not have an independent set of size K, then p1 = g/n. Since n =
O(g3) we have an Ω(n1/3)-hardness of approximation. Observe also that the number
of total words is N = K + g + 2eg+ g2K(K − 1) + 1 = O(g3) = O(n) so it is also hard to
approximate the problem to a factor of Ω(N1/3). ✷
Reminder of Theorem 4.1. For every k, Algorithm 4 computes argminA p (k,A) in
the singleton rules setting of the normalized probabilities model, in time O(N log(N)).
Proof of Theorem 4.1. Let A∗ denote the optimal solution, denote its most k popular
passwords as wi1 , . . . , wik , and denote also P
∗ as the total probability mass of the words
in A∗ according to the initial distribution: P ∗ =
∑
w∈A∗ Pr[w]. Therefore, p(k,A
∗) =∑k
j=1 Pr[wij ]/P
∗.
Clearly, all words wj s.t. j > ik belong to A∗ – otherwise, we could add such a word
and decrease the probability of the top k words. Similarly, all words wj s.t j < i1 must
not belong to A∗, otherwise they would belong to the set of most popular k words. We
now claim that wi1 , . . . , wik are k consecutive words.
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Suppose that there was some word w′ between some wij and wij+1 . Then A
∗ clearly
banned it, otherwise it would be one of the most popular k words. We claim that the
policy A′ where we ban wi1 and allow w
′ instead satisfies p(k,A′) ≤ p(k,A∗).
We denote p1 = Pr[wi1 ], q =
∑k
j=2 Pr[wij ] and p
′ = Pr[w′], and we know p1 ≥ p′. Then
p(k,A∗) = (p1 + q)/P ∗, whereas
p(k,A′) =
p′ + q
P ∗ − p1 + p′
.
Our goal is to show p(k,A′) ≤ p(k,A∗), which holds iff
(p′ + q)P ∗ ≤ (p1 + q)(P
∗ − (p1 − p
′))
By some algebraic manipulations, this holds iff
(p1 − p
′)P ∗ ≥ (p1 − p
′)(p1 + q)
which clearly holds because p1 − p′ is a non-negative quantity, and p1 + q =∑k
j=1 Pr[wij ] ≤
∑
w∈A∗ Pr[w].
As for the running time of the algorithm, it is obvious that sorting requires
O(N logN) time. Finding the minimum requires only O(N) time: if we denote ai =∑
i≤j≤i+k Pr[wj ] and bi =
∑
i≤j Pr[wj ], then based on ai and bi it is easy to compute ai+1
and bi+1 in O(1) time. ✷
Reminder of Claim 4.3. Fixm and s such thatm ≥ s. There exists a domainD of size
Θ(s2 log(m)) and a family ofm sets, F1, F2, . . . , Fm ⊆ D, such that each set in the family
contains
|D|
2s elements, and for every C ⊆ [m] of size |C| ≤ s, we have that the size of
the union
∣∣⋃
i∈C Fi
∣∣ ≥ |D|2s |C|4 . This domain can be constructed in randomized poly(s,m)
time.
Proof of Claim 4.3. Given m and s, we first pick a random function φ : [m] → [2s].
Fixing a subset C ⊆ [m] of size |C| ≤ s, we claim that |φ(C)| > |C|/2 w.p. at least
1− (0.825)|C|. Indeed,
Pr [|φ(C)| ≤ |C|/2] ≤ Pr [∃T ⊆ [2s] s.t. |T | = |C|/2 and ∀i ∈ C, φ(i) ∈ T ]
≤
(
2s
|C|/2
)
Pr [∀i ∈ C, φ(i) ∈ T ] ≤
(
4se
|C|
)|C|/2(
|C|/2
2s
)|C|
= e|C|/2
(
|C|
4s
)|C|/2
=
(√
e/4
)|C|
< (0.825)|C| .
So assuming |C| ≥ 8 we have that C is mapped to at least |C|/2 distinct images by φ
w.p.> 3/4. Also, if |C| ≤ 7 then probability of even two elements getting mapped to the
same image is at most
(
7
2
)
1
2s < 0.25 for s > 42.
We now construct D by taking d independently chosen such φ-mappings, which
we denote as φ1, φ2, . . . , φd, and so D = [2s] × [d]. We construct the family Fi =
{(φ1(i), 1), (φ2(i), 2), . . . , (φd(i), d)} for every i ∈ [m]. Clearly, for every i it holds that
|Fi| = d = |D|/2s. Supposed for the sake of contradiction that there exists some C ⊆ [m]
of size ≤ s such that
∣∣⋃
i∈C Fi
∣∣ ≤ |C|4 |Fi|. By construction, we have that∣∣∣∣∣
⋃
i∈C
Fi
∣∣∣∣∣ =
d∑
j=1
|{(φj(C), j)}| =
d∑
j=1
|φj(C)|
so by the Markov inequality we have that at least d/2 functions where the cardinality
of the image of C is less than |C|/2. Let XC,j be the indicator random variable of φj
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mapping the set C to no more than |C|/2 distinct elements, the Hoeffding bound gives
that
Pr
[
∃C of size ≤ s s.t.
∑
jXC,j > d/2
]
≤
∑
s′<s
(
m
s′
)
Pr[ 1d
∑
j
XC,j > 0.5] ≤ m
O(s)e−d/10
Setting d = Θ(s logm) gives that w.p. ≥ 1/2 no such C exists. ✷
Reminder of Theorem 4.4. Unless P = NP there is no polynomial time algorithm
(in N,m, n) which outputs argminS⊆[m] p (k,AS) in the positive rules setting and the
normalization model.
Proof of Theorem 4.4. Our reduction is from set cover.
Set Cover Instance: Sets S1, . . . , Sm, Universe U = {1, . . . , n} and integer k.
Question: Is there a set cover of size k − 1?
Now we defineW1, . . . ,Wn to be n disjoint sets of passwords
Wi =
{
wi,ℓ 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ n
5m5
}
.
We also define special passwords tj (j ≤ m) and τj (j ≤ k) which are not contained in
anyWi.
We define the following positive password rules:
Ri = {ti} ∪ {τj 1 ≤ j ≤ k}+
⋃
j:j∈Si
Wj .
We assign probabilities as follows:
Pr [wi,ℓ] =
(
1−
1
n3
)
1
m5n6
,
for each i ≤ n and ℓ ≤ m5n5. Observe that
Pr

⋃
i≤m
Wi

 = (1− 1
n3
)
,
so that almost all of the probability mass is concentrated inside the sets Wi and the
probability mass is uniformly distributed. We also set
Pr [τj ] =
1− x
n3k
,
and
Pr [tj ] =
x
n3m
,
where 0 ≤ x ≤ 1 will be defined later. First notice that∑
j≤k
τj +
∑
j≤m
tj = k
(
1− x
n3k
)
+m
( x
n3m
)
=
1
n3
,
so our probability distribution is well defined. Suppose that there is a set cover C ⊆ [m]
s.t. |C| ≤ k − 1 ∧
⋃
i∈C Si = U , and consider the solution AC . We cover all Wi’s and use
at most k − 1 t’s. Hence,
p (k,AC) ≤ ((k − 1)Pr[t] + Pr[τ ])
(
n3
n3 − 1
)
.
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Suppose that there is no set cover of size k. For every set of k or more rules S we have
at least k t’s in our solution so
p (k,AS) ≥ kPr[t] .
For every set of rules S that does not cover all the Wi’s we have at most(
1− 1n
) (
1− 1n3
)
-fraction of the total probability mass so
p (k,AS) ≥
((k − 1)Pr[τ ] + Pr[t])(
1− 1n
) (
1− 1n3
) .
It suffices to select x s.t.
((k − 1)Pr[t] + Pr[τ ])
(
n3
n3 − 1
)
< min
{
((k − 1)Pr[τ ] + Pr[t])(
1− 1n
) (
1− 1n3
) , kPr[t]
}
,
or —after some algebraic manipulation — equivalently,
a =
(
n3
n3−1
)
(
1− 1n3−1
) Pr[τ ] < Pr[t] < b = Pr[τ ] (k − 2) + 1n−1
(k − 2)− 1n−1
.
Observe that a ≤ Pr[τ ] ≤ b so it suffices to set x s.t. Pr[t] = a+b2 . We can solve for x to
get
x =
m
(
−3 + 2n+ 2n3 − 2n4 + k (n− 1)2
(
1 + n+ n2
))
m (−3 + 2n+ 2n3 − 2n4) + k2 (2− 2n− n3 + n4) + k
(
−2 + 4n+ n3 − 2n4 +m (n− 1)2 (1 + n+ n2)
) .
✷
Reminder of Claim 5.2. Pr [∃i, BADi] ≤ δ .
Proof of Claim 5.2. By the union bound it suffices to show that
Pr [BADi] ≤
δ
m
.
Our first step is to divide the passwords w ∈ P into buckets Bj based on their proba-
bility. For j > 0 we define
Bj =
{
w
ǫ
2j
≤ Pr [w ASi ] ≤
ǫ
2j−1
}
,
and for j = 0 we set
B0 = {w ǫ ≤ Pr [w ASi ]} .
Observe that
P =
∞⋃
j=0
Bj .
Let w ∈ Bj be given (j > 0) then by the Chernoff Bounds:
Pr [sw > sPr [w ASi ] + sǫ/2] ≤ exp
(
−2j−1 log
(
4m
δǫ
))
≤
4−2
j−1
δǫ
m
.
Notice that the bucket Bj contains at most |Bj | = 2j/ǫ passwords.
Pr [∃w ∈ Bj , sw > sPr [w ASi ] + sǫ/2] ≤
4−2
j−1
δǫ |Bj|
m
≤
δ
2j+1m
.
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Now if we union bound across all j > 0 we get
Pr

∃w ∈ ∞⋃
j=1
Bj , sw > sPr [w ASi ] + sǫ/2

 ≤ ∞∑
j=1
δ
2j+1m
=
δ
2m
.
Finally, we consider the passwords in B0. By Chernoff Bounds for each w ∈ B0 we have
Pr [|sw − sPr [w ASi ]| > sǫ/2] ≤
δǫ
2m
,
by applying the union bound |B0| ≤ 1/ǫ we get
Pr [∃w ∈ B0 |sw − sPr [w ASi ]| > sǫ/2] ≤
δ
2m
.
Combining our inequalities we obtain the desired result:
Pr [BADi] ≤ Pr

∃w ∈ ∞⋃
j=0
Bj , sw > sPr [w ASi ] + sǫ/2

 ≤ δ
m
.
✷
B. IMPOSSIBILITY OF CONSTANT-FACTOR UNIVERSAL APPROXIMATION
In this section we consider the following goal: given a constant c find a password com-
position policy A such that
p (k,A) ≤ c · p (k,A′) ,
for any other policy A′ and every value of k ≤ N . Such a policy — if it exists — would
provide a nearly optimal defense against both online attacks and dictionary attacks
simultaneously [Seeley 1989]. Unfortunately, Theorem B.1 rules out the possibility of
a constant universal approximation in the rankings model. Our impossibility result
holds even in the singleton rules setting. We show that it is possible to construct a
distribution D over rankings for which no universal approximation exists.
We construct our distribution D (algorithm 6) over rankings by merging two distri-
butions D1 and D2 over preference lists.
Intuition: Passwords sampled from D2 are highly secure, but passwords sampled
fromD1 are highly insecure. To make improve the security of D1 it is necessary to ban
all passwords inW , but this reduces the security of D2 significantly.
We make two claims (1) We must ban all but a small subset of passwords if we want
to even approximately optimize p (1,A). (2) We must keep a larger subset of passwords
to even approximately optimize p (k,A) for large values of k.
THEOREM B.1. For all constants c > 0 there exists distribution D over rankings
such that ∀A ⊆ P , ∃A′, k ∈ N, such that
p (k,A) > c · p (k,A′) .
PROOF. (sketch) Let P = W ∪X whereW =
⋃r
i=1Wi —Wi = {wi,1, . . . , wi,t}— and
X = {x1, . . . , xL} are two disjoint sets of passwords, where the parameters are set as
follows q = 12c , t = L = logN and r =
N−L
t . Our distribution over preference lists is
given by algorithm 6.
There are two cases to consider:
Case 1: ∃x ∈W −A then it is easy to see that
p (1,A) ≥
q
t
=
2c
t
=
2c
L
≥ 2c× p (1, X) .
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Algorithm 6 Sample D
Input:
Parameters L, r, q, t
Random Number u ∈ [0, 1].
Random Permutation πi ofWi for each i ∈ {1, ..., r}
Random Permutation piX over X
Random Permutation πP of P
Initialize: ℓ← empty ranking
if u ≤ q then ⊲ Select from D1
for i = 1→ r do
ℓ← 〈ℓ, π10r 〉 ⊲ Append random permutation ofWi
ℓ← 〈ℓ, πX〉 ⊲ Append random permutation of X
else ⊲ Select from D2
ℓ← πP
return ℓ
Case 2: Suppose that ∀x ∈ W we have x /∈ A and consider k = L with the solution P
— don’t ban any passwords. For the solution P we have
pi =
q
t
+
1− q
|X |+ |W |
,
for i ≤ t (e.g., for the t the passwords inW1), and
pi =
1− q
|X |+ |W |
,
for i > t.
c× p (k,P) = c
t∑
i=1
(
q
t
+
1− q
|X |+ |W |
)
+ c
k∑
i=t+1
1− q
|X |+ |W |
= c
(
q + (1− q)
L
L+ 10r
)
=
1
2
+
(
c−
1
2
)
L
L+ 10r
< 1 = p (k,A) .
C. EXPERIMENT RULES
We selected rules based on common types of rules used in constructing password com-
position policies, e.g., the policies recommended by NIST [Burr et al. 2006]. The rules
we selected are shown in Table VI. Positive and negative forms of each rule are shown.
In the positive rules setting, a password is allowed if it matches any positive rule. In
the negative rules setting, a password is banned if it matches any negative rule.
The dictionary check used the cracking dictionary from openwall.com. This dic-
tionary is used by one of the most well-known password crackers, John the Rip-
per [Designer 2010]. Since this dictionary contains all alphabetic strings up to size
3, it was pruned to only include entries of 4 characters or more for the “contains a
dictionary word” dictionary check.
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Table VI: Rules Used in Sampling Experiments
Positive Rule Negative Rule Details
8 characters or more Less than 8 characters
Length rules
9 characters or more Less than 9 characters
10 characters or more Less than 10 characters
11 characters or more Less than 11 characters
12 characters or more Less than 12 characters
13 characters or more Less than 13 characters
14 characters or more Less than 14 characters
15 characters or more Less than 15 characters
16 characters or more Less than 16 characters
1 digit or more Less than 1 digit
Character class rules
1 symbol or more Less than 1 symbol
1 lowercase or more Less than 1 lowercase
1 uppercase or more Less than 1 uppercase
2 digits or more Less than 2 digits
2 symbols or more Less than 2 symbols
2 lowercase or more Less than 2 lowercase
2 uppercase or more Less than 2 uppercase
In a dictionary Not in a dictionary
Dictionary checks
Contains a dictionary word Does not contain a dictionary
word
8 characters or more AND 1 up-
percase or more
Less than 8 characters OR less
than 1 uppercase
Combination Rules
8 characters or more AND 1 up-
percase or more AND 1 digit or
more
Less than 8 characters OR less
than 1 uppercase OR less than
1 digit
Notice that for some groups of rules, e.g., length rules, digit rules, etc., the subsets
defined by these rules are subsets or supersets of each other. For example, if the posi-
tive rule “8 characters or more” is in a policy, adding the “10 characters or more” rule
yields the same policy. We did this to prevent the selection of overly complex policies,
e.g., “8 characters” OR “11 characters” OR “12 characters” OR “14 characters.” How-
ever, we also selected a couple of “combination rules” to make policies more interesting.
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